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Abstract—This paper highlights an application of probabilistic
model checking to satellite positioning systems for aircraft guid-
ance. After introducing our formal approach based on using the
PRISM model checker, we built a model of a global navigation
satellite system (GNSS) based positioning system for a specific
flight in the probabilistic ⇡-calculus, a process algebra which
supports modelling of concurrency, uncertainty, and mobility.
After that, we encode our model into the PRISM language.
We then analyse the availability properties that relate to the
dependability and overall performance of the underlying system.
The aim of our research is to use PRISM to assist industrial
designers and developers of the GNSS.
Keywords—GNSS; satellite positioning; aviation; availability
analysis; probabilistic model checking
I. INTRODUCTION
Satellite positioning systems are used within the aviation
sector extensively. A three-dimensional global navigation satel-
lite system (GNSS) enables an aircraft to determine its position
(latitude, longitude, and altitude) anywhere on or above the
earth. Data transmitted from a navigation and communication
satellite provides the user with the time, the precise orbital
position of the satellite and the position of other satellites in
the system. In the past, they were only applied for military
purposes. However nowadays they are used for a wide range
of civil aviation applications, including navigation, communi-
cation, tracking, and flight management.
A number of previous EC projects such as GADEROS,
GRAIL, LOCASYS, and SATLOC, have proved the feasibil-
ity of introducing GNSS in non-critical systems by means
of theoretical studies and demonstrations. The current EC
project “European Train Control System Advanced Testing
and Smart Train Positioning System” (EATS) [1] proposes a
novel positioning system based on different techniques that
have proved useful from other industry viewpoints such as
using information sources from GNSS, UMTS, and GSM.
Furthermore, reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
(RAMS) [2]–[4] is proposed as a measure to analyse the
dependability of both mission-critical and safety-critical ap-
plications.
Availability requirements are identified as the most chal-
lenging obstacles towards GNSS aided positioning systems in
[2]. Many approaches can be used to analyse the availability
properties. Among them, simulation, analytical analysis, and
numerical analysis are popular and practical. Each of them has
its advantages and disadvantages that we do not discuss in this
paper. We consider probabilistic model checking, a numerical
analysis technique based on Markov models. It is a formal
method for analysing and verifying quantitative properties of
systems such as as time, stochastic behaviour or resources.
It is therefore highly suitable for modelling characteristics
of our system. The basic idea is to first build a (discrete-
time or continuous-time) Markov chain or Markov decision
process that captures the behaviour of the system, and then to
use the model to analyse precisely specified properties using
some temporal logics. This analysis is automatically performed
by using the PRISM model checker [5], and it involves a
combination of a traversal of the state transition system of
the model and numerical computation.
A PRISM specification can be generated directly via a
Markov chain variant described using the PRISM reactive
modules language [6]. Alternatively, a high level model (using
timed automata, or a process algebra, say) can be translated
into the PRISM language. According to PRISM’s manual, the
latter approach can be more efficient than the former. This is
due to the fact that PRISM is a symbolic model checker and
the underlying data structures used to represent the system
specification may function better when there is a high-level
structure and regularity to exploit.
In this paper we first specify the communication between
an aircraft and the associated satellites, taking into account
their combined mobility. We then analyse the models of the
aircraft and satellite set independently before the combined
system. Note that behaviour of the system contain a high level
of uncertainty (e.g., in signal transmission unreliability due to
solar radiation). In all our models we specify the system using
the probabilistic ⇡-calculus. Since PRISM only model checks
expressions in the reactive modules language, and this does not
allow for component mobility, so it is not currently possible to
model check the underlying process algebraic models directly.
In order to allow for automatic verification using PRISM, the
underlying continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs) semantic
models of our specification are first constructed using rules
presented in [7].
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section II we describe
the underlying GNSS based positioning systems. In Section
III the use of probabilistic model checking is introduced. In
Section IV we present our formal model of the system for a
navigation mission of a specific aircraft in the probabilistic ⇡-
calculus and its associated CTMC model respectively. Then,
we analyse availability properties using the PRISM model
checker in Section V. The related work is given in Section
VI. Finally, in Section VII we conclude the paper and propose
future work.
II. GNSS BASED POSITIONING SYSTEMS
A GNSS consists of three major parts: space segment,
control segment and user segment. Failure of any subsystem
will lead to errors in the final positioning. Fig. 1 illustrates
typical GNSS segments. First, the monitor stations (MS)
measure the pseudo-range of visible satellites and send the data
to the master control station (MCS). The MCS is responsible
for collecting and tracking data from each monitor station and
calculating the satellite orbit and clock parameters using a
Kalman filter. The results are transmitted to ground antennas
(GA) and then to the satellites. Under the control of theMCS,
the clock error, satellite ephemeris, navigation data, etc., are
calculated and then transmitted to the corresponding satellite,
and at the same time, the information is verified. The satellites
transmit data associated with their current states to the users
(U ). The users need to use the position information provided
by at least four satellites to determine the position during
navigation [8].
Space Segment
User Segment
Control Segment
Master Control Station (MCS) Monitor Stations (MS) Ground Antennas (GA)
Fig. 1. GNSS Segments.
Errors may exist in the process of information transmission,
and if these errors are passed on all the way to the user, the
position provided by the navigation system is unusable. The
space segment of a standard GNSS is composed of 24 global
navigation satellites. The arrangement of the GNSS satellite
constellation can guarantee that four or more satellites can
be observed at the same time from any location at any time
and ensure that the propagation of the satellite signal will not
be disturbed by the environment. Therefore, a GNSS based
positioning system should be a global and around-the-clock
navigation system that continuously provides uninterrupted
real-time navigation.
The GNSS control segment is implemented in the form of a
number of detecting and measuring systems distributed across
various locations in the world. The control segment continu-
ously monitors and tracks the satellites. The roles of control
segment components include: (1) monitoring of the satellite’s
operation and orbit states; (2) tracking and computation of
the orbit parameters of satellites and then sending them to
the satellites to be retransmitted to the users via a navigation
message; (3) synchronisation of the clocks of satellites; (4)
scheduling for satellites when necessary.
First, the monitor stations measure the pseudo-range of vis-
ible satellites every 6 seconds, correct them with ionospheric
and meteorological data, smooth the measurement to generate
data with a time interval of 15 seconds, perform smoothing
again to generate data with a 15 min time interval, and finally
send the data to the master control station. The master control
station is responsible for collecting and tracking data from each
monitor station and calculating the satellite orbit and clock
parameters using a Kalman filter. The results are transmitted to
ground antennas and then to the satellite. Under the control of
the master control station, the clock error, satellite ephemeris,
navigation data, etc., are calculated and then transmitted to the
corresponding satellite, and at the same time, the information
is verified. The satellites transmit data associated with their
current states to the users. The users need to use the position
information provided by the satellites for positioning during
navigation. In general, at least four satellites are required to
determine the user’s position.
In this process, the accuracy of the information that each
subsystem provides is critical and depends directly on the
navigation accuracy. From the monitor station to the master
control station, from the master control station to the ground
antenna, from the ground antenna to the satellite, and from
the satellite to the user, the entire process is implemented by
information transmission. Errors may exist in the process of
information transmission, and if these errors are passed on all
the way to the user, the position provided by the navigation
system is unusable.
III. PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKING
Our preliminary research into the verification of satellite
systems, in which we restrict our analysis only to a single
satellite and a satellite constellation but not a navigation
mission, is presented in [9], [10]. In an approach similar to
ours [11], a probabilistic model checking approach has been
used to analyse the performance of mobile wireless sensor
networks. The major difference between this work and ours
is that they model the mobile network using the stochastic
⇡-calculus and translate the model into the PRISM language,
whereas we model our mobile system using the probabilistic
⇡-calculus and translate the model into the PRISM language
using a different set of rules.
Our formal method consists of four stages. First, we
model in the probabilistic ⇡-calculus the behaviours of the
navigation satellite systems. This model is composed of two
separate models characterising the communications between
different segments and their mobility. The latter must be
able to be modified without changing the former. Second,
the global model is translated into the PRISM language,
and a corresponding CMC generated using PRISM (stage
1). The availability requirements that the system is required
to satisfy are formalised in some temporal logics (stage 2).
These quantitative properties are then checked using PRISM
(stage 3). They can be checked according our specific flight
navigation mission. Finally, we analyse the results given by
PRISM (stage 4).
A. Overview of the Probabilistic ⇡-Calculus
The probabilistic ⇡-calculus (⇡proc) adds a discrete proba-
bilistic choice operator to the classical ⇡-calculus. This prob-
abilistic operator associates internal actions with probabilities.
Definition 1. Processes use names to perform actions. The
types of actions include:
• ⌧ : a silent action that corresponds to an internal
interaction between sub-processes.
• x(y): an input action in which a process receives a
name y on channel x.
• xhyi: an output action in which a process sends a name
y on channel x.
• x(y): an bounded output action in which a process
sends a bound name y on channel x.
Definition 2. We assume P and Pi range over terms and ↵
ranges over actions. We assume a countable set of names that
range over x, y, xi, where i 2 {1, 2, ..., n}. A process P is
defined in ⇡proc using the following syntax (where I is an
index set, pi 2 (0, 1] with
P
i2I pi = 1, and A is a process
identifier):
• ↵ ::= ⌧ | x(y) | xhyi
• P ::= 0 | ↵.P | P
i2I
Pi |  P
i2I
pi⌧.Pi | P |P | vxP | [x =
y]P | A(x1, x2, ..., xi, ..., xn),
We now give an informal description of ⇡proc. The inactive
process 0 can perform no actions. Note that there are two
types of choice operator: nondeterministic choice
P
i2I
Pi and
probabilistic choice  P
i2I
pi⌧.Pi. The first is common in the
standard ⇡-calculus, and the second is a new operator in ⇡proc.
Branches of the probabilistic choice operator are normally
prefixed with ⌧ actions. Thus, the process  P
i2I
pi⌧.Pi selects
an index i 2 I with probability pi, performs a ⌧ action, and
then evolves to Pi.
The parallel composition of processes Pi and Pj is Pi|Pj ,
and can be either asynchronous or synchronous (via matching
input and output actions). The restriction vxP locally sets the
scope of x in process P , so x is treated as a new and unique
name within P . The process [x = y]P can evolve into process
P only if x and y are equal. Finally, A(x1, x2, ..., xi, ..., xn)
corresponds to a process definition clause with the form P =
A(x1, x2, ..., xi, ..., xn).
Definition 3. The operational semantics of ⇡proc are typically
expressed in terms of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs)
or Probabilistic Automata (PAs). The symbolic semantics of
⇡proc is expressed in terms of probabilistic symbolic transition
graphs (PSTGs). These are a simple probabilistic extension of
the symbolic transition graphs in [12].
B. The PRISM Model Checker
In this paper, we use the PRISM probabilistic model
checker [5]. Markov models to be verified using PRISM are
specified using the PRISM modelling language which is based
on the Reactive Modules formalism [6]. A fundamental com-
ponent of this language is a module. A system is represented
as the parallel composition of a number of modules. A module
is specified as:
module name ... endmodule
A module definition consists of two parts: one containing
variable declarations, and the other commands. At any time,
the state of a model is determined by the current value of all
of the variables of all of the components (modules). A variable
declaration has the form:
x : [0..2] init 0;
In this example, variable x is declared, with range [0..2] and
initial value 0. The behaviour of each module is specified using
commands, which include a guard and one or more updates of
the form:
[action] guard ! rate : update
or,
[action] guard ! rate1 : update1 + rate2 : update2 + ...
The (action) label is optional, and is used to force two
or more modules to synchronise. Updates in commands are
labelled with positive valued rates [5] for CTMCs. The +
indicates the usual non-deterministic choice. Within a mod-
ule, multiple transitions can be modelled either as different
individual updates in a command, or as multiple commands
with overlapping guards. The following examples:
[ ] x = 0 ! 0.5 : (x0 = 0);
[ ] x = 0 ! 0.8 : (x0 = 1);
and
[ ] x = 0! 0.5 : (x0 = 0) + 0.8 : (x0 = 1);
are equivalent. The guard x = 0 indicates that command is
only executed when variable x has value 0. The updates (x0 =
0) and (x0 = 1) and their associated rates indicate that the
value of x will remain at 0 with rate 0.5 and change to 1 with
rate 0.8. In a CTMC, when multiple possible transitions are
available in a state, a race condition occurs [13]. The rate of
the synchronised transition is the product of all the individual
rates.
C. Continuous Stochastic Logic
In this paper, we use Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL)
[14], [15] to specify availability properties. CSL is inspired
by the logic Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [16], and its
extensions to discrete time stochastic systems (PCTL) [17], and
continuous time non-stochastic systems (TCTL) [18]. There
are two types of formulae in CSL: state formulae, which are
true or false in a specific state, and path formulae, which are
true or false along a specific path.
Definition 4. Let a 2 AP be an atomic proposition, p 2 [0, 1]
be a real number, ./ 2 {, <,>, } be a comparison operator,
and I ✓ R 0 be a non-empty interval. The syntax of CSL
formulas over the set of atomic propositions AP is defined
inductively as follows:
• true is a state-formula.
• Each a 2 AP is a state formula.
• If   and  are state formulas, then so are ¬  and
  ^ .
• If   is state formula, then so is S./p( ).
• If ' is a path formula, then P./p(').
• If   and  are state formulas, then XI  and  UI 
are path formulas.
Formula S./p( ) asserts that the steady-state probability
for a state satisfying   meets the bound ./ p. Similarly,
formula P./p(') asserts that the probability measure of the
paths satisfying ' meets the bound given by ./ p. The operator
P./p(.) replaces the usual CTL path quantifiers 9 and 8.
Intuitively, 9' represents that there exists a path for which
' holds and corresponds to P>0('), and 8' represents that
for all paths ' holds and corresponds to P>1('). The temporal
operator XI is the timed variant of the standard next operator
in CTL; the path formula XI  asserts that a transition is made
to a   state at some time point t 2 I . Operator UI is the timed
variant of the until operator of CTL; the path formula  UI 
asserts that  is satisfied at some time instant in the interval
I and that at all preceding time instants   holds.
One of the most important operators is the P operator,
which is used to reason about the probability of an event. The
P operator is applicable to all types of models supported by
PRISM. It is often useful to compute the actual probability
that some behaviour of a model is observed. Thus, a variation
of the P operator to be used in PRISM, i.e., P=?[pathprop],
which returns a numerical rather than a Boolean value (i.e.,
the probability that pathprop is true). In our paper, we are
interested in directly specifying reliability, availability, and
maintainability properties which evaluate to a numerical value.
For example, we might wish to calculate the probability that
process 1 terminates before process 2 does (say). This can
be specified as P=?[!proc2 terminate U proc1 terminate],
where U is the “until” temporal operator.
Another important operator we use is theR operator, which
specifies a cumulative reward property that associate a reward
with each path of a model, but only up to a given time
bound. The property R=?[C <= t] corresponds to the reward
cumulated along a path until t time units have elapsed. For
CTMCs, the bound t can evaluate to a real value. Some typical
examples of properties using P and R operators can be found
on the Property Specification section of the PRISM website.
D. Translation Rules
For closed and finite processes (i.e., which do not replicate
themselves), the semantics of a probabilistic ⇡-calculus process
can be represented by a CTMC [7].
We assume that the set of all names in the system is N ,
which is partitioned into disjoint subsets: N fn, the set of all
free names appearing in processes P1, P2, ..., Pi, ..., Pn, and
N bn1 ,N bn2 , ...,N bni , ...,N bnn , the sets of input-bound names
for processes P1, P2, ..., Pi, ..., Pn. The translation rules of a
⇡proc model into the PRISM language, defined in [7], can be
summarised as follows.
• Rule 1. Each of the n sub-processes Pi becomes a
PRISM module with the same name.
• Rule 2. Module Pi has |N bn|+1 local variables. Each
element Qij of Si = {Qi1, ..., Qik}, which is the set of
the states of process Pi after each of its transitions (In
[7], the set of all these states is called the PSTG of
Pi), becomes an integer variable si whose values vary
from 1 to k.
• Rule 3. Each bound name xij of process Pi has a
corresponding variable xij with range 0, ..., |N fn| and
it is initialised to 0.
• Rule 4. The model includes |N fn| integer constants,
one for each free name, which are assigned distinct,
consecutive non-zero values. If the value of variable xij
is equal to one of these constants, then the correspond-
ing bound name has been assigned the appropriate free
name (by an input action). On the contrary, xij = 0
means that no input to the bound name has occurred
yet.
• Rule 5. For each free name x that models a communi-
cation channel between processes, we add a constant
rate x whose value is equal to the rate associated to
the channel x.
• Rule 6. (Probabilistic internal transition). For a tran-
sition Qi
M,⌧ ! {|p1 : Ri1, ..., pm : Rim|}, we add the
command:
[] (si = Qi) & M ! p1 : (s01 = Ri1) + ...+ pm : (s0i = Rim).
• Rule 7. (Output on free name). Process Pi outputs y
on free name x to Pj . For a transition Pi
M,xhyi ! Ri,
where x 2 N fn, we add, for each j 2 {1, ..., n}\{i},
the command:
[x Pi Pj y] (si = Pi) & M ! (s0i = Ri).
The channel x, sender Pi, receiver Pj , and sent name y
are all encoded in the action label. See [7] for details.
• Rule 8. (Output on bound name). Process Pi outputs y
on bound name x to Pj . For a transition Pi
M,xy ! Ri,
where x 2 N bni , we add, for each a 2 N fn and
j 2 {1, ..., n}\{i}, the command:
[a Pi Pj y] (si = Pi) &M & (x = a)! (s0i = Ri).
This is similar to Rule 7 except that it includes a
command for each possible value a of x.
• Rule 9. (Input on free name). Process Pj inputs z on
free name x from Pi. For a transition Pi
M,x(z) ! Ri,
where x 2 N fn, we add, for each y 2 N\N bni and
j 2 {1, ..., n}\{i}, the command:
[x Pj Pi y] (si = Pi) &M ! (s0i = Ri) & (z0 = y).
For input actions, an extra assignment (z0 = y) is
added to consider each possible received name y. It
models the update of the bound name z to y.
• Rule 10. (Input on bound name). Process Pj inputs z
on bound name x from Pi. For a transition Pi
M,x(z) !
Ri, where x 2 N bni , we add, for each a 2 N fn,
y 2 N\N bni and j 2 {1, ..., n}\{i}, the command:
[a Pj Pi y] (si = Pi) & M & (x = a) ! (s0i = Ri) & (z0 = y).
This rule combines elements of Rules 8 and 9, since
a command is added to consider each possible pairing
of channel a that x may represent and name y that
may be received. See [7] for details.
In addition, Rules 9 and 10 add some commands that need
to be removed. More specifically, labels x Pi Pj y appear on
a command of each module Pj , but do not appear in any of
the commands in module Pi. Therefore, commands with such
action labels are removed from Pj .
IV. SYSTEM SPECIFICATION
A. Reference Models
In particular, we analyse a navigation mission for a specific
flight, which was from Beijing to Guangzhou, and the entire
flight time was 2 hours 35 minutes. The specific time was
January 2, 2012 (Beijing time); the flight departed at 12:00 and
arrived in Guangzhou at 14:39. The entire flight was guided
sequentially by 17 GPS satellites. Although the aircraft could
generally receive satellite signals from more than 4 satellites
at a time, usually only the signals from the four satellites with
the best signals were used by the receiver for calculating the
position. According to NASA, 7 out of 17 satellites can be
chosen in our study based on their navigation times and the
mission of the flight. The Space Vehicle Numbers (SVNs)
of these 7 GPS satellites were: SV N49, SV N39, SV N55,
SV N58, SV N57, SV N51, and SV N36 respectively, as
illustrated in Fig. 2, and their parameters are shown in Table
I.
GPS satellites to be used
SVN57 (E) SVN51 (F) SVN36 (G)
GPS satellites in use
SVN55 (C) SVN39 (B) SVN49 (A) SVN58 (D)
Receive navigation signal
Switch of signal
Switch of GPS satellites
Fig. 2. GPS Constellations for an Air Line.
The reference model comprises 5 processes: U , MS,
MCS, GA and a satellite A. Each process transmits informa-
tion to objects to which it is connected. U receives a satellite
signal. A receives information from the GA which it then
transmits to the MS and U . The MS receives information
from the satellite and transmits the it to the MCS. As for the
MS, it analyses the data from the MS and transmits it to the
GA. The GA receives the control commands from the MCS
and sends them to A. The US National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA) provides GPS satellites’ status data available
daily1.
B. Formal Models
There are two kinds of movement: the physical movement
of satellites A, B,..., G and the aircraft U , and the virtual
movement of communication links between them. But these
two are independent. Their combined physical movement gives
rise to the virtual movement of the link between them2. We
consider a GPS satellite constellation corresponding to the ref-
erence models in Fig. 3, featuring one GA, MS, and MCS as
the control segment (CS), one aircraft U as the user segment,
and seven satellites (A,B, ..., G) as the space segment. We
assume that GA and MS can always communicate with the
seven satellites via the communication channels at the same
time.
A B D E F
MCS
a2a1
C G
MSGA
a3
a4 a5 a6 a7
d1 d2
d3 d4
d5 d6 d7
c b
Fig. 3. Reference Model of Control and Space Segments.
C B D E F
U U
e2e2
UU
e3
A G
e1 e4 e3 e1
Fig. 4. Reference Model of User and Space Segments.
1) Control Segment: Here, navigation information mainly
refers to the data describing the on-orbit state of satellites
that are transmitted by the navigation satellites. Satellites in
this system do not exchange information with one another. In
the real world, all GPS satellites are monitored by a set of
6 monitor stations. In this paper, we make the simplifying
assumption that there is a single monitor station, which is
essentially a combination of the 6 stations. As a result, each
satellite transmits information to the monitor station indepen-
dently and simultaneously.
The ⇡prob model of the monitor stations is: PS =
PSA | PSB | PSC | PSD | PSE | PSF | PSG, where PSA, PSB ,
PSC , PSD, PSE , PSF and PSG denote the communication
processes between satellites A, B,..., G and the monitor station
respectively. Due to space limitations, only the processes
associated with satellite A are given here, and all others can
be derived similarly. These detailed processes are shown as
follows:
PSA , va1.a1(x).([x = m1].PSA1 + [x = m2].PSA2)
PSA1 , vb.(↵1bhm1i.PSA + (1  ↵1)bhm2i.PSA)
PSA2 , bhm2i.PSA
1http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?Do=constellationStatus
2The links and their movement are obtained using the modelling, simulation,
analysis, and operations software Satellite Tool Kit (STK).
TABLE I. PARAMETERS AND AVAILABILITY OF NAVIGATION SATELLITES.
No SVN Launch date Model Life (years) Reliability Navigation interval Running time (seconds) Effective time (seconds) Availability (%)
A 49 24/03/2009 Block IIRM 10.0 0.80 12:00-14:29 8940 8935.069 99.9449
B 39 26/01/1993 Block IIA 7.5 0.70 12:00-13:55 6900 6896.188 99.9447
C 55 17/10/2007 Block IIRM 10.0 0.80 12:00-13:15 4500 4497.518 99.9449
D 58 17/11/2006 Block IIRM 10.0 0.80 12:00-14:35 9300 9294.871 99.9449
E 57 20/12/2007 Block IIRM 10.0 0.80 13:15-14:35 4800 4797.352 99.9449
F 51 11/05/2000 Block IIR 7.5 0.75 13:55-14:35 2400 2398.675 99.9448
G 36 10/03/1994 Block IIA 7.5 0.70 14:29-14:35 360 359.8012 99.9447
where a1 and b are private communication channels, and ↵1
and 1   ↵1 are transmission reliability (probability) at which
the satellite A sends information m1 or m2 respectively.
The reference model of the control segment consists of
3 subsystems and 2 channels. The subsystems are a monitor
station, a master control station and a ground antenna. The 2
channels are the channel between the monitor station and the
master control station, denoted as channel b, and the channel
between the master control station and the ground antenna,
denoted as channel c. The master control station receives
information from the monitor station through b, then transmits
it to the ground antenna via c. The ⇡prob model of the master
control station is as follows:
PM , vb.b(x).([x = m1].PM1 + [x = m2].PM2)
PM1 , vc.(↵2chm1i.PM + (1  ↵2)chm2i.PM )
PM2 , chm2i.PM
The reference model of the ground antenna is shown in
Fig. 3, which includes 9 subsystems and 8 channels. The
subsystems include a master control station, a ground antenna
and 7 GPS satellites. The 8 channels include channel c between
the master control station and the ground antenna and channels
d1, d2,..., d7 between the ground antenna and satellites A,
B, ..., G respectively. As for the monitor station, the ground
antenna communicates with the 7 satellites simultaneously.
There are 4 ground antennas worldwide that perform the daily
routine of transmitting commands to each satellite. We make
a similar assumption to the above, in that there is a single
ground antenna, which essentially is a combination of the 4
ground antennas.
The ⇡prob model of the ground antenna is: PG =
PGA | PGB | PGC | PGD | PGE | PGF | PGG, where
PGA, PGB , PGC , PGD, PGE , PGF and PGG denote the
communication processes between satellites A, B, C, D, E,
F and G respectively, and the ground antenna. As above,
navigation satellite A, is used as an example for the ⇡prob
specification of the ground antenna:
PGA , vc.c(x).([x = m1].PGA1 + [x = m2].PGA2)
PGA1 , vd1.(↵3d1hm1i.PGA + (1  ↵3)d1hm2i.PGA)
PGA2 , d1hm2i.PGA
2) Space Segment: The reference model of the space
segment consists of 4 subsystems and 3 channels. The 4
subsystems are the ground antenna, the satellites, the monitor
station and the user. Seven satellites are analysed, referred
to as A, B,..., G. These satellites receive information from
the ground antenna simultaneously and then transmit the
navigation information to the user. In this paper, the user and
the monitor station are assumed to receive navigation signals
from the satellites simultaneously.
The 3 channels are channel d between the ground antenna
and the satellite, channel e between the satellite and the user
and channel a between the satellite and the monitor station.
The channels between satellites A to G and the user are
denoted ei(i = 1, 2, 3, 4) respectively. The communication
channels between the ground antenna and satellites A to G
are d1, d2,..., d7 respectively. Due to space limitations, only
the ⇡prob models of A, B, C and G are given in this section.
The processes of D, E and F can be modelled similarly.
The ⇡prob model of ground antenna-satellite A-monitor
station-user is as follows. The ⇡prob models of ground antenna-
satellite B (and C, D)-monitor station-user can be derived
similarly.
PA , vd1.d1(x).([x = m1].PA1 + [x = m2].PA2)
PA1 , va1.(↵0a1hm1i.PA + (1  ↵0)a1hm2i.PA) | PA11
PA2 , a1hm2i.PA | PA21
PA11 , ve1.(↵e1hm1i.PA + (1  ↵)e1hm2i.PA)
PA21 , e1hm2i.PA
3) User Segment: The user segment usually refers to the
“GNSS receivers” that capture, process and track L-band sig-
nals from visible satellites to calculate the aircraft’s position,
time and velocity (PVT). The navigation mission of the flight
was used to study the availability of navigation satellites to
accomplish the mission during a specific segment of the flight.
The 7 satellites were used for navigation during the flight.
Due to the coverage limitation of satellites, the aircraft needs
to switch to different satellites for navigation guidance during
the flight. Fig. 4 gives the schema of the satellite navigation
switching that occurred during the entire flight. As a result,
there are 4 satellite groups available for navigation during the
entire flight: {A,B,C,D}, {A,B,D,E}, {A,D,E, F} and
{D,E, F,G}.
The switching occurred between satellites C and E, B and
F , and A and G. The switch from C to E occurs at 13:15, as
shown in Figure 5. The switch from B to F occurs at 13:55,
as shown in Figure 6. The switch from A to G occurs at 14:29,
as shown in Figure 7.
B AC D F GE
U U
e2 e4
switch
e1e3 e3
Fig. 5. Switch Satellite C with E
Fig. 5 illustrates the situation when the aircraft sequen-
tially uses satellite groups {A,B,C,D} and {A,B,D,E} for
navigation. First, the aircraft uses satellites C, B, A and D
C AB D E GF
U U
e1 e4 e3
switch
e2 e2
Fig. 6. Switch Satellite B with F.
C B A D E F G
U U
e4 e3
switch
e2e1 e1
Fig. 7. Switch Satellite A with G.
for navigation; the communication channels between these 4
satellites and the aircraft are e1, e2, e3 and e4. The ⇡prob
model of this process is as follows:
PU , PU1.PU2.PU3.PU4
PU1 , PC1 | PB1 | PA1 | PD1
PC1 , ve3.e3(x).([x = m1].PC1 + [x = m2].PC1)
PB1 , ve2.e2(x).([x = m1].PB1 + [x = m2].PB1)
PA1 , ve1.e1(x).([x = m1].PA1 + [x = m2].PA1)
PD1 , ve4.e4(x).([x = m1].PD1 + [x = m2].PD1)
Fig. 6 shows the scenario when the airplane changes from
using satellite group {A,B,D,E} to group {A,D,E, F}, and
Fig. 7 shows the scenario when the airplane changes from
using satellite group {A,D,E, F} to group {D,E, F,G}.
Similarly, when satellites {A,D,E, F} or {D,E, F,G} are
used, the corresponding ⇡prob models become:
PU3 , PA3 | PD3 | PE3 | PF3
PA3 , ve1.e1(x).([x = m1].PA3 + [x = m2].PA3)
PD3 , ve4.e4(x).([x = m1].PD3 + [x = m2].PD3)
PE3 , ve3.e3(x).([x = m1].PE3 + [x = m2].PE3)
PF3 , ve2.e2(x).([x = m1].PF3 + [x = m2].PF3)
and:
PU4 , PD4 | PE4 | PF4 | PG4
PD4 , ve4.e4(x).([x = m1].PD4 + [x = m2].PD4)
PE4 , ve3.e3(x).([x = m1].PE4 + [x = m2].PE4)
PF4 , ve2.e2(x).([x = m1].PF4 + [x = m2].PF4)
PG4 , ve1.e1(x).([x = m1].PG4 + [x = m2].PG4)
respectively.
C. Encoding ⇡prob models into the PRISM language
The ⇡prob processes are encoded into the PRISM language
in order to perform quantitative verification via probabilistic
model checking. Translation from ⇡prob models of the GNSS
based positioning system to their representation in PRISM
follows the translation rules given in Section 3.3. The model
between satellite A and the monitor station is used as an
example to illustrate the translation. The ⇡prob model of the
communication between satellite A and the monitor station is:
PSA , va1.a1(x).([x = m1].PSA1 + [x = m2].PSA2)
PSA1 , vb.(↵1bhm1i.PSA + (1  ↵1)bhm2i.PSA)
PSA2 , bhm2i.PSA
First, the ⇡prob process is broken down into the following
sub-processes, to facilitate the translation:
P , (va1)(vb)(P1 | P2 | P3 | P4)
P1 , a1(m1).P3.0
P2 , a1(m2).P4.0
P3 , ↵1b(m1).0+ (1  ↵1)b(m2).0
P4 , b(m2).0
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y P1 ؜ a1ሺm1ሻ. P3.0 
y P2 ؜ a1ሺm2ሻ. P4.0 
y P3 ؜. αଵ.bതሺm1ሻ. 0 ൅ ሺ1 െ αଵሻ. bതሺm2ሻ. 0 
y P4 ؜ bതሺm2ሻ. 0 
接着把 π演算的进程根据文献[150]的方法，把 π演算进程分别进行图形化，转换成
PSTG。卫星 A与监测站系统转化结果后的 PSTG，如下所示。 
 
图 65  导航子系统 PSTG图 
 
最后把 PSTG根据转换规则，把系统转化成 PRSIM的语言。转换过程如下。 
针对进程 P1，根据规则 9（input on free name）， ௜ܲ
ெ，௫ሺ୸ሻ
ሱۛ ۛۛ ሮۛ ܴ௜，执行下面命令： 
ൣݔ ௜ܲ ௝ܲݕ൧ሺs୧ ൌ P୧ሻ&ܯ ՜ ሺs୧ᇱ ൌ R୧ሻ&（zᇱ ൌ y） 
所以相应的 PRSIM语言可以是： 
Module P1 
S1:[1，2] init 1; 
X:[m1，m2] init 0; 
[]S=1->(S’=2)&(x’=m1) 
endmodule 
 
针对进程 P2，同样根据规则 9，执行规则 9命令，可以得到如下 PRSIM命令。 
Module P2 
S1:[1，2] init 1; 
Fig. 8. A PSTG of the ⇡prob process of interaction between A and MS.
Then, the process is converted into a graphical representa-
tion, namely a PSTG. The converted PSTG of the process of
the satellite A-monitor station system is as shown in Fig. 8.
Finally, the PSTG of the system is translated into the PRISM
language according to the transition rules. The transition
process is as follows. For process P1, we use rule 9 (Input on
free name). For a transition Pi
M,x(z) ! Ri, we add the command
[x Pj Pi y] (si = Pi) & M ! (s0i = Ri) & (z0 = y). So
the corresponding PRISM module of P1 can be described as:
module P1
S1 : [1, 2] init 1;
X : [m1,m2] init 0;
[] (S = 1)  > (S0 = 2) & (x0 = m1)
endmodule
For process P2, we use rule 9 to obtain the following
module:
module P2
S1 : [1, 2] init 1;
X : [m1,m2] init 0;
[] (S = 1)  > (S0 = 2) & (x0 = m2)
endmodule
For process P3, we first use translation rule 6 (Probabilistic
internal transition). For a transition Qi
M,⌧ ! {|p1 : Ri1, ..., pm :
Rim|}, we add the command: [] (si = Qi) & M ! p1 :
(s01 = Ri1) + ... + pm : (s0i = Rim). Then, we use rule 7
(Output on free name). For a transition Pi
M,xhyi ! Ri, we add
the command: [x Pi Pj y] (si = Pi) & M ! (s0i = Ri).
So the corresponding PRISM module of P3 can be derived:
module P3
S1 : [1..4] init 1;
X : [m1,m2] init 0;
[] (S = 1)  > a : (S0 = 2) :
[] (S = 2)& (x = m1)  > (S0 = 3)
[] (S = 1)  > (1  a) : (S0 = 4) :
[] (S = 4)& (x = m2)  > (S0 = 3)
endmodule
For process P4, the command is executed in accordance
with rule 9, and the following PRISM commands can be
obtained:
module P4
S1 : [1, 2] init 1;
X : [m1,m2] init 0;
[] (S = 1)  > (S0 = 2) & (x0 = m2)
endmodule
The translation of ⇡prob models of the remaining 6 satellites
to their corresponding set of PRISM modules, the information
transmission between the monitor station and the master con-
trol station, the information transmission between the master
control station and the navigation satellites and the navigation
information output from the navigation satellites to the user
can be derived similarly using the translation rules.
V. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Availability Properties
Although the accuracy of satellite positioning in the avi-
ation environment is in general sufficient, it is its availability
that limits the system dependability and overall performance.
Availability properties relate to the reliability and maintainabil-
ity of GNSS. Traditionally, it is the probability that the system
is operating at a satisfactory level and can be committed at
the start of a navigation mission when the mission is called
for at an unknown and random point in time. For repairable
satellites, we usually use the term Mean Time between Failure
(MTBF). MTBF is the average time from one failure to the
next, and also includes the repair time.
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), is the time taken to repair
a failed satellite. System designers should aim to allow for a
high MTTR value and still achieve the reliability requirements.
Availability is a mathematical function of MTBF and MTTR.
We assume that there is negligible delay before a failed satellite
begins to be repaired. The availability factor can be computed
using the following formula, and it is obvious that a GNSS
positioning system that can offer high availability is more
desirable than one that offer lower availability.
Availability =
MTBF
MTBF +MTTR
(1)
Furthermore, we proposed a modified concept for the
GNSS availability properties associated with the underlying
specification. The current approach involves prediction of the
“mean” availability over the system lifetime, assuming that the
system is in a steady state. This approach is not suited to the
specification of GNSS positioning systems, where the objective
is to guarantee what can be obtained from the system during
short periods of time that are meaningful to users, and that this
short term availability will be maintained during the lifetime
of the system. This requires a modification of the availability
concept, as it is currently understood. Thus, we propose and
distinguish availability properties as belonging to one of the
following five types:
1) How often do failures occur that require corrective
maintenance?
2) How often is preventative maintenance performed?
3) How quickly can indicated failures be isolated and
repaired?
4) How quickly can preventive maintenance tasks be
performed?
5) How long do logistics support delays contribute to
down time?
The properties defining these types are typically specified
using CSL as introduced in Section III (C). Simple examples
of such properties are “if a satellite fails, repair occurs within
a given time with a probability of 98% ”(property type 3):
P 0.98[fail(si) Ut repair(si)]), 8i = 1, ..., 7; and “what is
the worst-case expected time taken for a backup satellite to be
launched?” (property type 5): Rtimemax=?[F
00launch00].
B. Satellite Positioning for Aviation
As shown in Fig. 9, the GNSS enabled positioning system
constitutes a cycle of signal (data) transmission between sub-
systems. The satellite transmits the signal to the monitor
station, the monitor station transmits the signal to the master
control station, the master control station then transmits the
signal to the ground antenna, and finally, the ground antenna
uploads the information to the satellite.
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Fig. 9. Signal Transmission of Satellite Positioning Systems
Due to the impact of various factors, the monitor station,
master control station, or ground antenna may fail during the
operation of the system, resulting in a temporary interruption
of the operation, which will resume after repair. Similarly, the
satellite can also fail during operation and not transmit signals
properly. In this section, failures due to satellite ageing were
considered in the satellite analysis. Once failure occurs, new
satellites must be launched to replace the failed satellites. The
reliability data of the monitor station, master control station,
ground antenna and satellite are shown in Table II.
During the signal transmission from the monitor station to
the master control station as well as from the master control
station to the ground antenna, abnormal signal transmission
may occur, resulting in errors in information and correspond-
ing anomalies in the subsequent update information for the
TABLE II. RELIABILITY OF SPACE AND CONTROL SEGMENTS.
Systems MTBF (hours) MTTR
Satellite depends on the model 6 months
Monitor Station 156000 25.2 minutes
Master Control Station 1248 52.3 minutes
Ground Antenna 2310 4.2 hours
satellites. This can affect the navigation safety of users if the
situation is severe. If anomalies occur in signal transmission,
the master control station can correct the signal after a certain
period of time.
Based on a preliminary investigation, it is assumed in our
analysis that the information exchange among the satellites,
monitor station and ground antenna does not itself generate
information anomalies, but its reliability is a direct conse-
quence of the reliabilities of the satellites and ground antenna.
It is additionally assumed that information anomalies can only
occur in the signal transmission between the master control
station and the monitor station. These assumptions and related
data are based on relevant reports3 on GPS, as summarised in
Table III.
TABLE III. TRANSMISSION RELIABILITY OF SEGMENTS.
Systems Transmission reliability
Satellite-Monitor Station depends on reliability of satellites
Monitor Station-Master Control Station 0.99999
Master Control Station-Ground Antenna 0.99999
Ground Antenna-Satellite depends on reliability of ground antennas
Where available, the data used for quantitative analysis in
this study were collected from the official published data [19].
In other cases we used data for similar systems. The satellite
models involved in the GPS satellite availability analysis of
this section are Block-IIA, Block-IIR and Block-IIRM. A
CTMC model was constructed based on the analysis of the
relationships in the navigation system so that a quantitative
analysis could be performed to check the model.
C. Preliminary Results and Discussion
Quantitative analysis was performed on the 7 satellites
involved in the system using the PRISM model checker. As
the satellites are independent of each other, probabilistic model
checking is run on each satellite separately according to its
respective characteristics. The starting point of the analysis
on each satellite was the time on which the satellite was
launched. The availability analysed is the satellites for the
navigation mission from the beginning until the end of the
mission. The data on the GPS satellites’ availability obtained
from the quantitative analysis can be shown in Table I.
The availability of various GPS satellites was greater than
99.944% under the set rules. Satellites A, C, D and E were
the latest model, Block-IIRM, and had the largest availability
for navigation: the probability of these satellites being available
for navigation during the mission was 99.9449%. The model of
satellite F is Block-IIR, and its probability of being available
for navigation during the mission was 99.9448%. The model of
satellites B and G is Block-A, and its availability is 99.9447%.
3Global Positioning System (GPS) Performance Quarterly Report
The above results indicate that satellites of the same model
had the same availability. Model Block-IIRM had the largest
availability for navigation, followed by Block-IIR and then
Block-A. The availability data indicates that the navigation
time and the duration of use of a GPS satellite do not have
large impacts on the satellite’s availability. Rather, the factor
that had the greatest effect on navigation was the design life
and reliability of the navigation satellite.
TABLE IV. AVAILABILITY OF THE NAVIGATION MISSION.
Channels Satellitetransition
Channel
available time (s)
Aggregated
available time
Availability
of navigation
channel 1 D-D 9294.8710
37179.4767s 99.9448%channel 2 A-G 9294.8707channel 3 B-F 9294.8638
channel 4 C-E 9294.8710
The availability of the GPS constellation of seven satellites
are shown in Table IV, and the availability reaches 99.9448%.
We are neglecting environmental factors, so our measure of
availability to may be slightly greater than when they are
included. An actual mission will involve multiple satellites,
and each channel has multiple backup satellites. Thus, once
a failure occurs, the channel will be switched to a backup
satellite. Therefore, the availability of GNSS in practice will
be larger than that shown in our analysis. Moreover, the
presence of multiple satellites will potentially increase the
overall availability along an air line, but the increase of
available satellites does not necessarily guarantee an improved
user-satellites geometry due to the similar orbital arrangement
of most GNSS satellites.
To validate the reliability of the evaluation data, we referred
to some of the literature and official reports from the civil
aviation sector. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) releases quarterly reports on the performance analysis
of the system based on the operation of the GPS in each
quarter to ensure the navigation safety of global aviation [20].
According to the monitoring reports released by the FAA,
the availability of each individual GPS satellite has been
approximately 99.96% [20]. This number is very close to that
obtained in our analysis and is in line with the estimated
value of this study, confirming, from one line of evidence,
the feasibility and applicability of our approach.
VI. RELATED WORK
Prediction of satellite navigation availability is very useful
for numerous applications such as airplane navigation missions
and in-car navigation systems. Simulation is nowadays widely
used to analyse performance and predicate availability for
a variety of satellite systems [21]–[24]. In [21], software
simulation based on a Markov model of a GPS constellation of
24 satellites is used to obtain availability estimates of GNSS
in Taiwan. In [22], an automated method for predicting the
number of satellites available to a GPS receiver, at any point
on the Earth’s surface at any time is described. In [23], the
availability of a navigation and communication satellite system
(NCSS) is studied to examine the feasibility of using a NCSS
constellation in Australia. A performance model was proposed
in [24] to evaluate the availability of satellite systems over
geographic grid averaging areas over a given period of time.
Availability characteristics for GPS and GPS augmented by
geostationary satellites (GSs) are compared in [25] . Availabil-
ity is determined for users in the contiguous zone in United
States, based on the planned operational GPS constellation and
various GS deployments. In [26], a method for determining the
availability of three different GPS services (positioning, sup-
plemental navigation, and sole means navigation) is described
for both two-dimensional and three-dimensional applications.
A 21-satellite and a 24-satellite constellation are considered.
In the companion paper [27], state probability analyses of 21-
and 24-satellite constellations based on a Markov chain model
are discussed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present a formal approach to analyse the
availability properties of GNSS based positioning systems. We
have modelled some aspects (e.g., communication, movement,
unreliable transmission) of the system for navigating a specific
flight in the probabilistic ⇡-calculus, a process algebra which
supports modelling of concurrency, uncertainty, and mobility.
Then we encode our process algebraic models into the PRISM
language. Finally, we analyse the availability properties that
relate to the dependability and overall performance of the
underlying system.
Although nowadays satellite positioning is commonly used
in the aviation sector, it is still to gain a foothold in other
industries such as the rail industry. One major barrier that
presents its application to railway safety is the lack of evidence
that the concept and theory for the verification of railway appli-
cations with introduction of GNSS is applicable based on the
joint use of aviation and railway standards and requirements.
Up to now availability analysis is non-trivial because difficult
situations exist on the railways due to the limitations of the
GNSS coverage in urban canyons, tunnels, and forest areas.
For future work, we plan to add a fourth environment segment
that simulates such difficult situations to the GNSS.
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